Category: Pesticides

ref1394_x180-fThe National Academies have promised a report by the end of January 2012 on priorities (both short- and long-term) for studying the health, safety, and environmental effects of nanotechnology.  According to the National Academies, this report will address the following matters:  the properties of engineered nanomaterials; methods and technologies for “detecting, measuring, analyzing, and monitoring” engineered nanomaterials; what studies are needed; what testing methods need to be developed; the models for predicting impacts that should be developed; research priorities; and the criteria for evaluating research progress.  In its “Statement of Task,” the National Research Council has explained:

“The committee will take into consideration current and emerging uses of engineered nanomaterials and the scientific uncertainties related to physical and chemical properties, potential exposures, toxicity, toxicokinetics, and environmental fate of these materials.”

I will discuss the report when it is issued.  More information on the National Academies’ research strategy is available at

http://dels.nas.edu/Study-In-Progress/Research-Strategy-Environmental-Health/BEST-K-08-01-A#

This is a promising developing to look forward to, but as with all things, the proof is in the, er, nanopudding (sorry, couldn’t resist).  Initiating a task such as this is daunting, with the result a framework for assessment, not the ultimate assessment.  But it is a necessary step in what is certain to be a long process.

In a separate project, the National Academies are considering more than the health, safety, and environmental effects of nanotechnology.  Pursuant to the Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (Pub. L. No. 108-153), Congress has mandated triennial reviews of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI).  The National Academies’ National Research Council convened a committee to conduct the second such triennial review, and its report is due in 2013.  Much of the review will entail examining the economic impact of nanotechnology and ways to measure the value of nanotechnologies.

Information on the triennial review project is available at

http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49409

The two projects discussed in this post demonstrate the efforts to address the two important aspects of progress in the uses of nanotechnology – understanding the health, safety, and environmental effects, and measuring the economic benefits of nanotechnology.

white-house-south-2007-djIn a June 9, 2011, memorandum to the heads of U.S. executive departments and agencies, entitled Policy Principles for the U.S. Decision-Making Concerning Regulation and Oversight of Applications of Nanotechnology and Nanomaterials, the White House confirmed its commitment to a “science-based” approach to health and safety matters related to nanotechnology.  The memorandum issued from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The memorandum described its approach as

“generally applicable principles relevant to promoting a balanced, science-based approach to regulating nanomaterials and other applications of nanotechnology in a manner that protects human health, safety, and the environment without prejudging new technologies or creating unnecessary barriers to trade or hampering innovation.”

The memorandum went on to explain that the approach it establishes is inherent in the risk-based approach commonly used by federal agencies such as the FDA, but is grounded in best available, and evolving, science.

 This is a tall order.  It is important that the White House explicitly addressed nanotechnology and nanomaterials, rather than using the vague term “emerging technologies,” as it has done in the past.  But perhaps the most significant part of the memorandum is in its elevation of the science-based approach over other possible approaches (technology-based, economics-based, etc.) to the study and regulation of nanomaterials.

 Intending to provide guidance to existing federal agencies, the memorandum stated:  “Federal agencies should avoid making scientifically unfounded generalizations that categorically judge all applications of nanotechnology as intrinsically benign or harmful.”  Consumer trust, the memorandum went on to say, is important in encouraging technological innovation.

 On the one hand, the memorandum eased industry concerns that nanotechnology will be viewed as “bad” and all nanomaterials as “hazardous” because of the flurry of attention focused on the technologies and the concerns voiced by various groups.  But on the other hand, the message is clear that science will govern the study of nanomaterials and any decisions about whether or how to regulate.  And that is also a message to industry to come forward with the science that the agencies need.

 The memorandum also announced the creation of an interagency working group to coordinate this basic framework across agency lines, promote coordination of regulatory activities, and share information.

 How is this policy likely to play out in the relevant departments and agencies?  Here are a couple of recent steps that illustrate the initial approach:

 ●  On June 10, 2011, the FDA issued a Draft Guidance, Considering Whether an FDA-Regulated Product Involves the Application of Nanotechnology, to provide manufacturers, suppliers, importers, and other stakeholders with the FDA’s “current thinking” on the subject.  The Draft Guidance was issued in conjunction with the White House memorandum.  The document provided no definitions, nor did it provide any information on the regulatory status of any products.  Rather, the document stated that its purpose is “to help industry and others identify when they should consider potential implications for regulatory status, safety, effectiveness, or public health impact that may arise with the application of nano-technology in FDA-regulated products.”

 The FDA Draft Guidance is available at

http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm257698.htm

 ●  A similar document was issued by EPA setting forth its proposed policy for obtaining data on nanoscale materials in pesticides, pursuant to its authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).  Another important aspect of what EPA is considering is a case-by-case analysis of whether a nanoscale ingredient in a pesticide is considered “new” for the purpose of study and regulation.  This is a sharp departure from EPA’s earlier stance that it would consider all nanoscale ingredients as “new,” whether or not a non-nanoscale form of the ingredient was already registered under FIFRA.  The new approach is consistent with the urging of the White House memorandum that agencies avoid generalizations about nanomaterials and based all decision on the scientific evidence.

 The prepublication version of this notice is available at

http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/prepub-nanopest.pdf

 

The White House memo is available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/nanotechnology-regulation-and-oversight-principles.pdf

prod liab imageListening to the speakers at the American Bar Association section webinar on the subject of “Nano Governance:  The Current State of Federal, State, and International Regulation,” discussed in a recent blog post, I was struck by the proliferation of “alphabet soup” agencies and programs involved in deciding whether and how to regulate nanomaterials in the workplace, consumer products, and the environment.  The short list includes such well-known acronyms as FDA, EPA, OSHA, NIOSH, CPSC, NNI, TSCA, FIFRA, FHSA, REACH, and ISO (International Organization for Standardization), as well as many lesser known acronyms, such as SNUR (Significant New Use Rule), PPPA (Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970), CPSIA (Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act), OCSPP (EPA’s Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention), NMSP (Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program), NICNAS (Australian National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme), WPMN (international Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials), and many similar legislation and agencies on the state level.

The good news is that nanotechnology is receiving much attention across the board from regulatory agencies.  The less good news is that the work of determining the health and safety effects of nanomaterials on humans and the environment, including ecological systems, is fragmented and slow.

The U.S. federal government, by necessity, is comprised of a web of agencies and programs, each with many jobs.  With so much work to be done, smaller and smaller groups are focusing on specific research and problem solving initiatives.  As the federal government is accustomed to doing in many areas of concern, efforts to coordinate agencies and programs devoting a fraction of their time to nanotechnology health and safety issues are being utilized.  One clearinghouse for the efforts across the government is the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI).  Is that enough to prevent duplication of effort and resources and to encourage communication and progress?

The dilemma is not new.  It is at the foundation of all complex systems.  To get something done, the groundwork must be laid by a highly focused group.  As recommendations move along the regulatory channels, eventually (maybe) the work results in action by way of regulations or new/amended statutes.  Greater oversight and decision making at the top of the regulatory pyramid may sound more efficient, but the careful groundwork could be lost and the democratic principles on which our regulatory system is based (including publication and public comment) could be diminished.

usalawyerstoday.com

usalawyerstoday.com

On May 19, 2011, the American Bar Association’s Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources (Pesticides, Chemical Regulation and Right-to-Know Committee) and Section of Science and Technology Law (Nanotechnology Committee) presented a webinar on the subject of “Nano Governance:  The Current State of Federal, State, and International Regulation.”  Speakers came from all sectors, including private law firms and industry.

Listening to these excellent and expert speakers for a full afternoon, certain clear points and patterns emerged that I will share briefly here.

1.  Size.  It really is all about size.  Every speaker acknowledged the role of the size of nanoparticles in developing testing protocols and approaches to regulation.  Nanomaterials may behave differently from macroscale materials of the same substance, and may differ from one another in significant ways.

2.  Progress.  Regulatory agencies are turning their attention to the health and safety aspects of nanotechnology.  There is a pervasive concern about the prevalence of these technologies and the paucity of studies.

3.  Fragmentation.  Attention to the potential issues raised by nanotechnology continues to be highly fragmented.  There has been intensely focused attention to some issues, but others remain to be addressed.

For example, EPA, through its authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), has focused attention on regulating nanosilver and other nanomaterials in FIFRA-registered products.  Under FIFRA, all pesticides need to be registered (i.e. licensed) before they may be sold, and as part of that process, a pesticide applicant must show that its product will not “cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”  Currently, some pesticides that contain nanomaterials are already on the market, having been licensed prior to EPA’s scrutiny of nanomaterials.  Other applications are pending for registration of pesticides containing nanomaterials.  EPA’s draft policy proposal would treat a pesticide as “new” if it contains a nanoscale material, regardless of whether a non-nanoscale form of that same ingredient is already in a registered product.  Thus, for example, nanosilver would be treated as “new” even though silver is a registered pesticide.  But risks assessment lags behind.  According to webinar speaker William Jordan, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Pesticide Programs for EPA, “more data are needed in all disciplines to have adequate information to assess the risks of nanosilver.”

Nanomaterials elsewhere in products and the environment are subject to potential regulation under other federal statutes, and some state programs (California being represented at the webinar).  But progress in one area does not necessarily mean progress elsewhere.  The EU and Australia are progressing, but the need remains for some vehicle to standardize definitions and approaches.  And standardization remains a debatable issue in itself.

4.  Industry Uncertainty.  Webinar speaker Rosalind Volpe, Executive Director of an industry association, Silver Technology Working Group (a program of Silver Research Consortium LLC, Durham, NC), expressed the concerns of the industry that EPA’s steps to regulate nanosilver give the impression that nanomaterials are harmful.  The industry is concerned that there is a “cloud of uncertainty” over it, which discourages investors and deters innovation, even where the nanomaterials used may not pose any health or safety problems.

5.  Bottom Line.  The bottom line, as usual, seems to be the need for an appropriate balance between technological progress and safety of humans and the environment.

Other speakers at the webinar included representatives of:

Nanotechnologies Industries Association, Brussels, Belgium

Chemical Control Division, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, EPA

U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission

California Nanotechnology Initiative

California Department of Toxic Substances Control

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.

. . . and several attorneys in private practice

nano 6In my previous post, I indicated that I would be moving on to discuss the relevancy arm of the Daubert admissibility test.  It turns out I have a few more thoughts about the reliability arm.

 What does it mean for admissibility purposes when the expert testimony sought to be introduced in litigation is based on an established methodology used in a new context?  This is likely to be an issue when parties seek to introduce studies of the health and safety effects of nanomaterials.    Does such a new subject of a study transform an established methodology into a new and untested methodology?  If so, the evidence would face a much more rigorous level of scrutiny.

 Researchers acknowledge that the state of research on the health and safety aspects of nanomaterials is in its infancy.  Some have noted that due to the costs of obtaining necessary quantities of nanomaterials for animal testing, that type of toxicological testing has given way to the use of more efficient in vitro laboratory tests.  While both animal testing and in vitro tests have been used to test toxicity for a very long time, their reliability in testing chemicals at the nanoscale has yet to be fully assessed.  This could lead to exclusion of the evidence under either the Frye or Daubert analysis, at least until such the use of the studies gains greater reliability.  In other words, courts could view this as a new and untested methodology.

 A related issue is the value of in vitro tests generally in litigation to show a connection between exposures and injuries.  Studies conducted in laboratory containers do not receive high marks from courts generally when introduced to demonstrate causation between an exposure and a person’s injuries.  Courts prefer both epidemiological studies – which determine statistical risks in human populations – and animal bioassays over in vitro studies.

 All of this adds up to some thorny questions that will have to be resolved.

supctThis post continues the discussions in earlier posts about evidentiary standards for admissibility of health and safety studies on nanomaterials under both the Frye standard and the Daubert standard.  I will resume the reliability discussion here, this time focusing on the reliability standards applied in the federal courts and other Daubert jurisdictions.

Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), reliability of expert scientific evidence is determined in relation to four factors.  These four “general observations” set forth in the Daubert decision were intended to provide guidance to the trial court making a decision about admissibility of expert scientific evidence.  All four need not be favorable to the party seeking admission of the evidence for the evidence to be ruled admissible.  The Supreme Court has said that when it comes to scientific studies, evidentiary reliability is the equivalent of scientific validity.  What makes a scientific study (and the expert testimony relying on it) valid?  The Supreme Court set forth these “general observations”:

 (1)  Whether the scientific theory or technique on which the evidence is based has been tested (presumably by the scientific method);

(2)  Whether the study has been published or has undergone another form of peer review;

(3)  The known or potential rate of scientific error associated with the methodology;

(4)  Whether the methodology has achieved general acceptance in its field.

Although these factors reduce the weight of general acceptance (the sole Frye criterion) in the admissibility analysis, the reality is that the Daubert test has raised the bar in litigation for plaintiffs seeking to have their scientific proof admitted.  These factors are often applied strictly.

Will scientific studies on the health and safety effects of nanomaterials be treated differently under the Daubert reliability analysis than under the Frye general acceptance test?  The primary difficulty under Daubert, as under Frye, is the newness of the studies.

Although the Supreme Court in Daubert said that the focus of the reliability analysis should be on the scientific methodology or technique – and not on the conclusions reached – the Court subsequently modified that statement.  In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court said that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely separate from one another,” thus inviting the trial court to consider the conclusion and whether it constitutes the kind of novel theory that may not be admissible.

It may be true generally that newer methodologies may not have been sufficiently tested, peer reviewed, or accepted in the relevant scientific community, and that they could have a potentially high (or unknown) rate of error.  But one issue that will need to be sorted out in the era of nanostudies will be whether the methodologies for these studies consist of tried-and-true testing methods or, in contrast, will be viewed as novel because of their focus on materials at the nanoscale.  This distinction could make a critical difference in whether such studies will be admitted in litigation in a Daubert jurisdiction.  Tried-and-true carries more admissibility weight.

Perhaps one way to look at this issue – and one that is relevant to the emerging studies of nanomaterials – is the way that a federal district court analyzed the problem in Smith v. General Electric Co., 2004 WL 870832 (D. Mass. 2004).  When confronted with novel and admittedly “controversial” studies, the court concluded that the experts were “serious scientists with controversial views that are in many respects on the periphery of the mainstream, but views that are not so divorced from a scientific method of investigation that they can be dismissed as quackery or armchair conjecture.”  While the district court was likely correct in observing that Daubert did not require or perhaps even empower a court to “determine which of several competing scientific theories has the best provenance,” many would reject the flexible view of Daubert applied in Smith.

Reliability is only part of the admissibility analysis for scientific studies articulated by the Supreme Court in Daubert.  Relevance of the evidence is equally important, and my next post on the subject will look at the relevance of scientific evidence as it has been explained by the Supreme Court in Daubert and Joiner (mentioned above).

Lab beakerMy previous post began a conversation about applying the evidentiary rules for admissibility of scientific studies and expert testimony to the emerging studies on the health and environmental effects of nanomaterials, all in the context of the toxic tort litigation that is soon to come.  This post will continue that conversation by looking at the legal rules to determine the reliability and scientific validity of such studies.  In particular, this post will look at the Frye rule and its continuing viability in a significant minority of jurisdictions.

Under the older Frye rule, reliability was determined solely by whether the scientific technique has achieved “general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  States that have adopted and continue to apply the Frye test for admissibility of expert evidence have further clarified and refined the rule.  Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 810 (Minn. 2000), that a two-pronged test would apply:  “First, [the] technique must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and second, the particular evidence derived from that test must have a foundation that is scientifically reliable.”  In Goeb, the plaintiffs alleged that their son had suffered permanent injuries from exposure to a pesticide that had been applied in their residence.  The court agreed that the trial court had properly excluded the plaintiffs’ expert scientific evidence of causation because the scientific methodology used was not generally accepted and because the expert’s analysis had no “independent validation.”

The Frye rule has frequently been criticized, however.  Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court (in a case adopting the Daubert rule and the federal evidentiary standard), has criticized Frye as incorrectly favoring the conclusions of scientists over courts in matters of a legal nature, arguing that it “ ‘abdicates’ judicial responsibility for determining admissibility to scientists uneducated in the law.” See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 392, 394-95 (Alaska 1999).  The Minnesota Supreme Court countered this argument by stating that “the Frye general acceptance standard ensures that the persons most qualified to assess scientific validity of a technique have the determinative voice.”  Goeb, at 813.  In Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235 (Md. 2009), the Maryland Court of Appeals established a compromise rule.  In Blackwell, the plaintiffs alleged that their child’s autism was caused by thimerosal in childhood vaccines.  The court reaffirmed its adherence to the Frye doctrine, characterizing the doctrine in Maryland as requiring that “[g]enerally accepted methodology . . . must be coupled with generally accepted analysis” by the expert.  This approach thus assures that the trial judge has the final word on acceptance of the evidence.

The debate continues, however, over whether the Frye doctrine relies on excessive deference to the scientific community on matters of a legal nature.  This disagreement is not likely to be resolved soon and is reflected in the split in the states over the adoption of the Daubert rule, which, in contrast, is heavily dependent on judges to evaluate the scientific evidence.

What will happen to nanotechnology studies in a Frye jurisdiction?

The answer may depend on whether the studies are viewed as new and untested because they involve materials at a scale that has generally not been previously studied for health and environmental impacts.  Frye does not favor new technologies.  Frye admissibility is premised upon a history of the technologies that has evolved to the point of receiving general acceptance in the particular scientific community.

On the other hand, an argument could be made that such studies are simply versions of well-established and generally accepted scientific studies, whether of an epidemiological nature (statistical studies of human populations) or a toxicological nature (such as studies on mice conducted in a laboratory).  It is worth noting, too, that studies of human populations generally take much longer to develop, and nanomaterials measurable in consumer products and the environment are a relatively new occurrence in the scheme of things.  Thus, the studies on nanomaterials now emerging are laboratory experiments.  See, for example, the studies summarized in Powell & Kanarek, Nanomaterial Health Effects – Part 1:  Background and Current Knowledge, 105 Wisc. Med. J. 16 (2006).

In the next post, I will examine the Daubert reliability standard.

usalawyerstoday.com

usalawyerstoday.com

Many of my posts have talked about the need for studies on the health, safety, and environmental effects of nanomaterials.  But it has been a long time since I raised the question of what these studies may mean for toxic tort litigation.  As in any litigation, the evidence, including scientific studies and the experts who interpret them, must be admissible under the relevant rules of evidence.  In the United States, there are two basic approaches to the admissibility of expert evidence in the courts – (1) the federal courts’ approach, which is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and a trio of cases beginning with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and (2) the approach known as the Frye test.  Regardless of the approach used by the particular court considering the evidence, early studies that may demonstrate health or environmental risks associated with nanomaterials will have an uphill battle for admissibility in the courts.

Over the next month, I intend to discuss some of these issues in a series of posts.  This post will consider the first question:  What is it about this evidence that will be so difficult for the courts?

To begin with, let’s briefly look at the rules for admissibility of the evidence in court:

 1.  Frye Test:  This test derives from the case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), a criminal case that involved a scientific lie-detection technique that was a sort of precursor to the modern lie-detector tests.  The court there said that “while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”  Thus, courts view as admissible under this test only expert evidence derived from scientific studies or techniques in general use, and usually long-standing use, in the particular field, and which most experts in the field recognize as being reliable.

 2.  Daubert Test:  The Daubert case itself was a toxic tort, a prescription drug product liability action, so the Supreme Court had before it on the record scientific studies that resemble the kinds of studies of exposure-and-outcome that might be produced for nanomaterials.  The Supreme Court held that the test for admissibility of expert evidence under the Federal Rules is broader than the Frye test and requires that the proponent of the evidence demonstrate that it be reliable – i.e. that it be scientifically valid – and that it be relevant to a particular issue in the case, not that it merely be suggestive of health problems.  The Court emphasized that the trial judge is the “gatekeeper” who must make a determination at an early time in the litigation as to whether the expert evidence is admissible.  If it is not admissible, often plaintiffs’ cases are dismissed prior to trial.

 What evidentiary challenges will nanomaterial studies present?

 ●  The studies will provide only probabilistic evidence.  This means that the studies will only show statistical associations (probabilities) between exposure to a particular nanosubstance and a particular outcome (e.g. illness).  While the extent to which probabilistic evidence differs from traditional forms of proof in tort cases (such as motor vehicle accidents) is a matter of degree, the inability of the studies to confirm the causal relationship between exposure to a substance and the illness the plaintiff suffers will be problematic for plaintiffs’ cases.

 ●  The illnesses are likely to be “generic.”  Some substances previously studied are linked to “signature diseases,” which occur very rarely in the general population, but with greater frequency among people exposed to the substance.  Silicosis (silica dust), asbestosis (asbestos), and pleural mesothelioma (asbestos) are examples.  But most cancers, respiratory conditions, and neurological disorders, for example, are caused by a variety of triggers, some related to exposures, others genetic or idiopathic.  It is therefore difficult to differentiate those caused by a particular exposure and those arising for other reasons.

 ●  The nanostudies will be new.  Under either admissibility test, new and untested or unreplicated studies may not pass muster.  In toxic torts, history has shown that early plaintiffs may have considerable difficulty with the admissibility of their evidence; even if the evidence is ruled admissible, problems of proof arise because juries may not view the early evidence as having much weight.   As time goes on, these studies may gain more acceptance in the field – or, they may be proved to be aberrations.

 Next up:  Admissibility and scientific reliability of nanostudies.

nano 3On November 22, 2010, EPA submitted a proposed rule under Section 8(a) of TSCA to the Office of Management and Budget for its review.  The proposed rule includes reporting requirements for manufacturers of nanoscale materials and could be published in the Federal Register for public comment in December.

 The first of three proposed rules expected in 2011, this proposed rule would require disclosure of information on manufacturing and processing, as well as on exposure and release of nanomaterials.  This is merely a prelude to any actual regulation of the industries and processes making use of nanotechnology.  It is a critical step toward reducing risks to human health and the environment.  But it also highlights the fact that regulation of nanomaterials is a long, slow process that may not yield satisfactory results for many years.

 In September, an EPA representative told members of the nanomaterials industry, “We are at the stage where we really don’t have a clear idea of how to manage risk. . . . The more information we can collect through regulation—on what is being manufactured, toxicity data, and the development of the proper protocols for measuring toxic effects of the nanomaterial—the better off we will be to manage the risk and demonstrate to the American people we have a handle on the issue.”

 The current proposal can be seen as early steps in risk assessment, but far from the risk management eventually envisioned by EPA.

The European Union may be further ahead.  On November 24, 2010, the European Parliament voted to extend its restriction on many hazardous substances to most electrical and electronic products, but stopped short of imposing a restriction on nanosilver and carbon nanotubes.  Observers say that it is likely that these substances will be incorporated into the law when the law comes up for review in three years.  Thus, the EU may be heading toward management of the risks of nanotechnology more quickly than the U.S.

 Even so, why so slow?  Regulators should get moving on resolving obstacles such as the scope of nanoscale definitions, deciding how much data is enough before effective regulation may be accomplished, and whether small businesses warrant an exception to regulation.

 

Sources (all by BNA subscription):

225 BNA Daily Env’t Rptr. A-6 (Nov. 24, 2010)

34 BNA Chemical Reg. Rptr. 1149 (Nov. 24, 2010)

34 BNA Chemical Reg. Rptr 960 (Oct. 4, 2010)

www.h20technologies.com

www.h20technologies.com

The U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) Strategic Plan Draft was posted at http://strategy.nano.gov for public comment on November 1, 2010.  The NNI was launched in 2001 with 8 agencies and now consists of the nanotechnology-related activities of 25 agencies.  Fifteen of these agencies have R&D budgets related to nanotechnology.

In reflecting on the 10-year history of U.S. nanotechnology research and development, the NNI Draft highlights its work as having “established a thriving nanotechnology R&D environment, laid the crucial groundwork for developing commercial applications and scaling up production, and created demand for many new nanotechnology and manufacturing jobs in the near-term.”  (Draft, p. 1)  Looking to the future, the NNI notes that nanotechnology R&D is “far from full realization.”  (Draft, p. 2)  The goals of the NNI continue to be broad:  continued development of R&D; developing the technologies into products for commercial and consumer use; and developing the physical and human resources to achieve these goals.

Goal 4 of the Draft Strategic Plan is “Support responsible development of nanotechnology,” including the twin goals of understanding and managing the risks of the technologies.  Among the NNI participating agencies in 2010 are EPA, FDA, National Institutes of Health (NIH), and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).

The NNI Draft Strategic Plan focuses directly on the benefits of nanotechnology, rather than the risks.  But many of the participating agencies – and many more – need to be involved on the risk side of the proverbial risk-benefit analysis.  This is happening, as reported previously in posts on this blog ranging from FIFRA to TSCA to the FDCA.

 But equally important is the need for communication and coordination on both the benefits and risks of nanotechnology.  And that extends beyond governmental regulation to businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Aside from governmental action, various voluntary initiatives and partnerships have emerged.  A report out of the Woodrow Wilson  International Center for Scholars, “Voluntary Initiatives, Regulation, and Nanotechnology Oversight:  Charting a Path,” gives an overview of the initiatives – some publicly sponsored, some developed by business, and some representing joint business-NGO partnerships.  These initiatives have the common, though separate, goal of developing a strategy to oversee environmental, health, and safety risks raised by nanomaterials.  The report is available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/voluntary/

Three initiatives discussed in some detail in the report are:

 ●  “Nano Risk Framework,” jointly developed by duPont and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

 ●  “Responsible Nano Code,” sponsored by stakeholders from the United Kingdom

 ●  “Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program,” developed by EPA

 The report critically analyzes these specific initiatives – as well as others more generally – and concludes that they have a welcome role in the future of nanotechnology safety and health efforts.

The ideal world does not exist, of course.  But in this world, a strategy that incorporates the risks and benefits of these developing technologies and brings together as many varied interests as possible representing all affected parties, including the environment, is warranted.  It can provide needed checks and balances along the way.