Category: Evidence

The Bigger Picture: Thinking About Technology, Nano and Otherwise

Posted Sep.25, 2011 under Environment, Evidence, Government Agencies, Litigation, Products Liability, Supreme Court, Toxic Torts
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Wondering where we’ve been for the past month?

 My summer was spent thinking and writing about technology – all sorts of technology.  It got me thinking about how technology has changed our lives and how it is poised to change all aspects of the law.  Let me share with you my summer projects, which go well beyond nanotechnology issues.  I hope it will enable me to put the legal issues of nanotechnology in a broader context going forward.

 1.  Neuroscience and Tort Law.  I and my co-author (and co-blogger) Eric Laury embarked upon a project more than a year ago to examine how the so-called “new neuroscience” will impact tort law.  By “new neuroscience” we mean mostly functional neuroimaging (fMRI and SPECT), but also any other neuroscientific methods to examine the human brain, including brain wave technology.   Our approach to this extensive law review article was both doctrinal (i.e. how the new neuroscience will eventually change the rules of tort doctrine) and practical (i.e. the problems of incorporating it in tort litigation, particularly under the rules of evidence).  We spent a lot of time predicting the effect that the new neuroscience will eventually have in the courtroom.  Professor Stephen Morse at UPenn Law School has pointed out that much of what we currently know as legal doctrine is based upon “folk psychology” – that is, what we believe causes people to act the way they do.  The new neuroscience will eventually change the law by changing our understanding of human behavior.

 2.  Cell Phones.  I also found myself writing a piece on cell phones and product liability.  In particular, I looked at whether actions claiming the telecommunications industry should be marketing cell phones with headsets to protect against the hazards of radio frequency (“RF”) emissions should be allowed, or whether they are preempted by regulations granting the FCC the authority to set radiation standards for cell phones.  The question, it turns out, it much more complicated than one might think and involves several federal statutes and regulations, including the two major statutes governing the wireless networks in this country.  The Supreme Court will consider a petition for certiorari in Farina v. Nokia, 625 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2010), early in the new term.  Even if cert is not granted, this topic likely will continue to make waves in the courts.  My article appears on the BNA subscription service at 39 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 871 (Aug. 5, 2011) and 26 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 949 (Aug. 10, 2011).  It also appears in U.S. Law Week at 80 U.S.L.W. 321 (Sept. 13, 2011).

 3.  Nanotechnology and the Environment.   I also wrote a short article to be published in the “Insight” section of the upcoming Natural Resources & Environment journal, which is the journal of the ABA Environmental Law Section.  My goal was to alert attorneys to some of the regulatory initiatives either in the works or in the pipeline.  The piece focuses on TSCA, FIFRA, OSHA, and foreign initiatives (EU, Australia).  It was interesting to look at the impact of nanomaterials exclusively from the environmental (outdoors and indoors) perspective.

So while I may not have been spending a lot of time blogging about nanotechnology and the law, I was busy getting the bigger picture on technology.

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Daubertizing Nanolitigation – Part 4

Posted Mar.22, 2011 under Chemicals, Cosmetics, Evidence, Health, Litigation, Pesticides, Products Liability, Research, Safety, Toxic Torts

nano 6In my previous post, I indicated that I would be moving on to discuss the relevancy arm of the Daubert admissibility test.  It turns out I have a few more thoughts about the reliability arm.

 What does it mean for admissibility purposes when the expert testimony sought to be introduced in litigation is based on an established methodology used in a new context?  This is likely to be an issue when parties seek to introduce studies of the health and safety effects of nanomaterials.    Does such a new subject of a study transform an established methodology into a new and untested methodology?  If so, the evidence would face a much more rigorous level of scrutiny.

 Researchers acknowledge that the state of research on the health and safety aspects of nanomaterials is in its infancy.  Some have noted that due to the costs of obtaining necessary quantities of nanomaterials for animal testing, that type of toxicological testing has given way to the use of more efficient in vitro laboratory tests.  While both animal testing and in vitro tests have been used to test toxicity for a very long time, their reliability in testing chemicals at the nanoscale has yet to be fully assessed.  This could lead to exclusion of the evidence under either the Frye or Daubert analysis, at least until such the use of the studies gains greater reliability.  In other words, courts could view this as a new and untested methodology.

 A related issue is the value of in vitro tests generally in litigation to show a connection between exposures and injuries.  Studies conducted in laboratory containers do not receive high marks from courts generally when introduced to demonstrate causation between an exposure and a person’s injuries.  Courts prefer both epidemiological studies – which determine statistical risks in human populations – and animal bioassays over in vitro studies.

 All of this adds up to some thorny questions that will have to be resolved.

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Daubertizing Nanolitigation – Part 3

Posted Mar.01, 2011 under Chemicals, Cosmetics, Environment, Evidence, Health, Litigation, Pesticides, Products Liability, Research, Safety, Toxic Torts

supctThis post continues the discussions in earlier posts about evidentiary standards for admissibility of health and safety studies on nanomaterials under both the Frye standard and the Daubert standard.  I will resume the reliability discussion here, this time focusing on the reliability standards applied in the federal courts and other Daubert jurisdictions.

Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), reliability of expert scientific evidence is determined in relation to four factors.  These four “general observations” set forth in the Daubert decision were intended to provide guidance to the trial court making a decision about admissibility of expert scientific evidence.  All four need not be favorable to the party seeking admission of the evidence for the evidence to be ruled admissible.  The Supreme Court has said that when it comes to scientific studies, evidentiary reliability is the equivalent of scientific validity.  What makes a scientific study (and the expert testimony relying on it) valid?  The Supreme Court set forth these “general observations”:

 (1)  Whether the scientific theory or technique on which the evidence is based has been tested (presumably by the scientific method);

(2)  Whether the study has been published or has undergone another form of peer review;

(3)  The known or potential rate of scientific error associated with the methodology;

(4)  Whether the methodology has achieved general acceptance in its field.

Although these factors reduce the weight of general acceptance (the sole Frye criterion) in the admissibility analysis, the reality is that the Daubert test has raised the bar in litigation for plaintiffs seeking to have their scientific proof admitted.  These factors are often applied strictly.

Will scientific studies on the health and safety effects of nanomaterials be treated differently under the Daubert reliability analysis than under the Frye general acceptance test?  The primary difficulty under Daubert, as under Frye, is the newness of the studies.

Although the Supreme Court in Daubert said that the focus of the reliability analysis should be on the scientific methodology or technique – and not on the conclusions reached – the Court subsequently modified that statement.  In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court said that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely separate from one another,” thus inviting the trial court to consider the conclusion and whether it constitutes the kind of novel theory that may not be admissible.

It may be true generally that newer methodologies may not have been sufficiently tested, peer reviewed, or accepted in the relevant scientific community, and that they could have a potentially high (or unknown) rate of error.  But one issue that will need to be sorted out in the era of nanostudies will be whether the methodologies for these studies consist of tried-and-true testing methods or, in contrast, will be viewed as novel because of their focus on materials at the nanoscale.  This distinction could make a critical difference in whether such studies will be admitted in litigation in a Daubert jurisdiction.  Tried-and-true carries more admissibility weight.

Perhaps one way to look at this issue – and one that is relevant to the emerging studies of nanomaterials – is the way that a federal district court analyzed the problem in Smith v. General Electric Co., 2004 WL 870832 (D. Mass. 2004).  When confronted with novel and admittedly “controversial” studies, the court concluded that the experts were “serious scientists with controversial views that are in many respects on the periphery of the mainstream, but views that are not so divorced from a scientific method of investigation that they can be dismissed as quackery or armchair conjecture.”  While the district court was likely correct in observing that Daubert did not require or perhaps even empower a court to “determine which of several competing scientific theories has the best provenance,” many would reject the flexible view of Daubert applied in Smith.

Reliability is only part of the admissibility analysis for scientific studies articulated by the Supreme Court in Daubert.  Relevance of the evidence is equally important, and my next post on the subject will look at the relevance of scientific evidence as it has been explained by the Supreme Court in Daubert and Joiner (mentioned above).

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Daubertizing Nanolitigation – Part 2

Posted Feb.01, 2011 under Chemicals, Cosmetics, Environment, Evidence, Health, Litigation, Nanotubes, Pesticides, Products Liability, Research, Safety, Toxic Torts

Lab beakerMy previous post began a conversation about applying the evidentiary rules for admissibility of scientific studies and expert testimony to the emerging studies on the health and environmental effects of nanomaterials, all in the context of the toxic tort litigation that is soon to come.  This post will continue that conversation by looking at the legal rules to determine the reliability and scientific validity of such studies.  In particular, this post will look at the Frye rule and its continuing viability in a significant minority of jurisdictions.

Under the older Frye rule, reliability was determined solely by whether the scientific technique has achieved “general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  States that have adopted and continue to apply the Frye test for admissibility of expert evidence have further clarified and refined the rule.  Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 810 (Minn. 2000), that a two-pronged test would apply:  “First, [the] technique must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and second, the particular evidence derived from that test must have a foundation that is scientifically reliable.”  In Goeb, the plaintiffs alleged that their son had suffered permanent injuries from exposure to a pesticide that had been applied in their residence.  The court agreed that the trial court had properly excluded the plaintiffs’ expert scientific evidence of causation because the scientific methodology used was not generally accepted and because the expert’s analysis had no “independent validation.”

The Frye rule has frequently been criticized, however.  Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court (in a case adopting the Daubert rule and the federal evidentiary standard), has criticized Frye as incorrectly favoring the conclusions of scientists over courts in matters of a legal nature, arguing that it “ ‘abdicates’ judicial responsibility for determining admissibility to scientists uneducated in the law.” See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 392, 394-95 (Alaska 1999).  The Minnesota Supreme Court countered this argument by stating that “the Frye general acceptance standard ensures that the persons most qualified to assess scientific validity of a technique have the determinative voice.”  Goeb, at 813.  In Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235 (Md. 2009), the Maryland Court of Appeals established a compromise rule.  In Blackwell, the plaintiffs alleged that their child’s autism was caused by thimerosal in childhood vaccines.  The court reaffirmed its adherence to the Frye doctrine, characterizing the doctrine in Maryland as requiring that “[g]enerally accepted methodology . . . must be coupled with generally accepted analysis” by the expert.  This approach thus assures that the trial judge has the final word on acceptance of the evidence.

The debate continues, however, over whether the Frye doctrine relies on excessive deference to the scientific community on matters of a legal nature.  This disagreement is not likely to be resolved soon and is reflected in the split in the states over the adoption of the Daubert rule, which, in contrast, is heavily dependent on judges to evaluate the scientific evidence.

What will happen to nanotechnology studies in a Frye jurisdiction?

The answer may depend on whether the studies are viewed as new and untested because they involve materials at a scale that has generally not been previously studied for health and environmental impacts.  Frye does not favor new technologies.  Frye admissibility is premised upon a history of the technologies that has evolved to the point of receiving general acceptance in the particular scientific community.

On the other hand, an argument could be made that such studies are simply versions of well-established and generally accepted scientific studies, whether of an epidemiological nature (statistical studies of human populations) or a toxicological nature (such as studies on mice conducted in a laboratory).  It is worth noting, too, that studies of human populations generally take much longer to develop, and nanomaterials measurable in consumer products and the environment are a relatively new occurrence in the scheme of things.  Thus, the studies on nanomaterials now emerging are laboratory experiments.  See, for example, the studies summarized in Powell & Kanarek, Nanomaterial Health Effects – Part 1:  Background and Current Knowledge, 105 Wisc. Med. J. 16 (2006).

In the next post, I will examine the Daubert reliability standard.

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Daubertizing Nanolitigation – Part 1

Posted Jan.26, 2011 under Chemicals, Cosmetics, Drugs, Environment, Evidence, Food, Health, Litigation, Pesticides, Products Liability, Safety, Toxic Torts
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Many of my posts have talked about the need for studies on the health, safety, and environmental effects of nanomaterials.  But it has been a long time since I raised the question of what these studies may mean for toxic tort litigation.  As in any litigation, the evidence, including scientific studies and the experts who interpret them, must be admissible under the relevant rules of evidence.  In the United States, there are two basic approaches to the admissibility of expert evidence in the courts – (1) the federal courts’ approach, which is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and a trio of cases beginning with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and (2) the approach known as the Frye test.  Regardless of the approach used by the particular court considering the evidence, early studies that may demonstrate health or environmental risks associated with nanomaterials will have an uphill battle for admissibility in the courts.

Over the next month, I intend to discuss some of these issues in a series of posts.  This post will consider the first question:  What is it about this evidence that will be so difficult for the courts?

To begin with, let’s briefly look at the rules for admissibility of the evidence in court:

 1.  Frye Test:  This test derives from the case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), a criminal case that involved a scientific lie-detection technique that was a sort of precursor to the modern lie-detector tests.  The court there said that “while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”  Thus, courts view as admissible under this test only expert evidence derived from scientific studies or techniques in general use, and usually long-standing use, in the particular field, and which most experts in the field recognize as being reliable.

 2.  Daubert Test:  The Daubert case itself was a toxic tort, a prescription drug product liability action, so the Supreme Court had before it on the record scientific studies that resemble the kinds of studies of exposure-and-outcome that might be produced for nanomaterials.  The Supreme Court held that the test for admissibility of expert evidence under the Federal Rules is broader than the Frye test and requires that the proponent of the evidence demonstrate that it be reliable – i.e. that it be scientifically valid – and that it be relevant to a particular issue in the case, not that it merely be suggestive of health problems.  The Court emphasized that the trial judge is the “gatekeeper” who must make a determination at an early time in the litigation as to whether the expert evidence is admissible.  If it is not admissible, often plaintiffs’ cases are dismissed prior to trial.

 What evidentiary challenges will nanomaterial studies present?

 ●  The studies will provide only probabilistic evidence.  This means that the studies will only show statistical associations (probabilities) between exposure to a particular nanosubstance and a particular outcome (e.g. illness).  While the extent to which probabilistic evidence differs from traditional forms of proof in tort cases (such as motor vehicle accidents) is a matter of degree, the inability of the studies to confirm the causal relationship between exposure to a substance and the illness the plaintiff suffers will be problematic for plaintiffs’ cases.

 ●  The illnesses are likely to be “generic.”  Some substances previously studied are linked to “signature diseases,” which occur very rarely in the general population, but with greater frequency among people exposed to the substance.  Silicosis (silica dust), asbestosis (asbestos), and pleural mesothelioma (asbestos) are examples.  But most cancers, respiratory conditions, and neurological disorders, for example, are caused by a variety of triggers, some related to exposures, others genetic or idiopathic.  It is therefore difficult to differentiate those caused by a particular exposure and those arising for other reasons.

 ●  The nanostudies will be new.  Under either admissibility test, new and untested or unreplicated studies may not pass muster.  In toxic torts, history has shown that early plaintiffs may have considerable difficulty with the admissibility of their evidence; even if the evidence is ruled admissible, problems of proof arise because juries may not view the early evidence as having much weight.   As time goes on, these studies may gain more acceptance in the field – or, they may be proved to be aberrations.

 Next up:  Admissibility and scientific reliability of nanostudies.

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